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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS-PROPERTY RIGHTS: A MERETRcIous
RELATIONSHIP MAY CREATE AN IMPLIED PARTNERSHmP-In re Estate
of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72,499 P.2d 864 (1972).
In the early 1950's, decedent separated from his wife and began
living with appellant. During the subsequent seventeen years decedent,
appellant and their four children operated a cattle ranch in Wash-
ington. In 1961 profits from that business were used to purchase prop-
erty known as the Malo farm in the name of decedent. During the fol-
lowing years, appellant participated both in the decisions concerning
the farm's management and in its day-to-day operations. Upon the
death of the decedent in 1969, his surviving spouse filed a petition for
probate of his will. Thereafter appellant filed a petition alleging a
partnership interest in the Malo farm. The trial court dismissed appel-
lant's claim for failure to state a cause of action, and the dismissal was
affirmed by the court of appeals. The Washington Supreme Court
reversed. Held: The survivor of a couple living in a meretricious rela-
tionship may establish an implied partnership interest in property by
showing the surrounding acts and circumstances of the relationship.
In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
I. BACKGROUND
One who cohabits' with another knowing that the relationship does
not constitute a valid marriage is a meretricious "spouse. ' 2 Either or
both of the parties to the relationship may be meretricious. Thus, if a
prior marriage of either is still valid and both know this, then both
parties are meretricious.3 Alternatively, if a relationship exists in
1. Cohabitation seems to contemplate more than a single night of intimacy. Al-
though no necessary minimum period of time is evident from any of the cases reviewed,
the term "cohabitation" generally denotes a situation in which the parties have "set up
housekeeping." See, e.g., Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965)
(thirteen years); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948) (seven years).
See also Coolidge, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 866, 873 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Coolidge].
2. See Coolidge at 873.
3. See In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 96 P. 684 (1908). It is not significant that
one or even both of the parties is capable of contracting a valid marriage. It is the
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which at least one of the parties has a "good faith belief' that a valid
marriage exists, then the relationship is referred to as a putative mar-
riage.4 In the latter class of cases, Washington courts will exercise an
equity power to protect the innocent party or parties.5
Prior to Thornton the leading Washington case involving a meretri-
cious relationship6 was Creasman v. Boyle,7 which established that in
the absence of some trust relationship, 8 property acquired by a couple
living in a meretricious relationship is presumed to belong to the party
knowledge of the invalidity, not the capability of the parties to contract a valid mar-
riage, that makes a relationship meretricious. Thus in Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.
2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965), both parties were capable of contracting a valid marriage,
but relief was denied because under the circumstances the woman lacked a good faith
belief that a valid marriage existed. Her belief rather than her legal ability to contract a
valid marriage was determinative of her status.
4. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Powers v.
Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 P. 1080 (1921); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P.
1079 (1908); See Coolidge at 866. Hence, if a couple has undergone a marriage cere-
mony and only one is aware of a legal impediment to the validity of the marriage, then
only that party is meretricious and the "innocent" or putative party is not tainted by his
partner's knowledge. See Buckley v. Buckley, supra. Even a good faith belief that a
common law marriage is valid is sufficient to make the believer a putative spouse. See
Powers v. Powers, supra.
5. See Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908). In Buckley the court
held that where a woman in good faith enters a marriage contract with a man:
a status is created which will justify a court rendering a decree of annulment...
upon complaint of the innocent party; and where in such a case the facts are [that]
... the woman helped to acquire and very materially save the property, the court
has jurisdiction... [to award] to the innocent, injured woman such proportion of
the property as, under all the circumstances, would be just and equitable.
This approach is in contrast to that of other jurisdictions which have adopted the "puta-
tive wife doctrine" wherein the putative wife is automatically entitled to one-half of the
relationship's joint accumulations. Through this doctrine civil effects of a valid marriage
are conferred on a putative spouse who acts in good faith. Succession of Pigg, 228 La.
779, 802, 84 So. 2d 196, 198 (1955); Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 398-99, 247 S.W. 828,
830 (1923). The doctrine has, for many years been applied in Texas (Lee v. Smith, 18
Tex. 141, 145 (1856)) and Louisiana (Patton v. Philadelphia and New Orleans, I La.
Ann. 98 (1846)). Where it is applied, property acquired during the putative relationship
is quasi-community property, and the putative spouse is entitled to a one-half interest.
Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 726, 38 So. 2d 502, 505 (1949).
6. A "meretricious relationship," as used in this note, connotes a relationship in
which both parties cohabit, knowing that a valid marriage does not exist.
7. 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
8. If realty or personalty is taken in the name of a grantee other than the person who
advanced the consideration to a third party for the purchase, and the grantor and
grantee are strangers to each other in the sense that there is no marital relationship be-
tween them, a resulting trust will arise and the person in whose name the property is
taken will be presumed to hold the legal title subject to the equitable ownership of the
party furnishing the consideration. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND) § § 440, 441,
442 and 444 (1968). For application to Washington law, see Creasman v. Boyle, 31
Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
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in whose name legal title rests.9 This presumption is harsh on its face,
and later cases have lessened but not eliminated its impact.10
There are at least three instances in which the Creasman presump-
tion either is overcome or does not arise. First, the presumption is not
conclusive and can be rebutted by "evidence to the contrary."'"
Second, no presumption arises as to property which can be clearly
traced by the court and identified as belonging to one of the parties.'?
Finally, Washington courts will not ignore the effect of a conveyance
or contractual agreement through imposition of the presumption.' 3
However, the above exceptions to the application of the Creasman
presumption do not cover all situations in which it may work a sub-
stantial injustice. For example, under the Creasman presumption the
survivor of a meretricious relationship who is unfortunate enough to
have had his or her partner die without an agreement regarding dispo-
sition of their joint assets will probably receive nothing, assuming the
other party took title in his or her own name.' 4 Furthermore, even if
both parties are still living at the time oftheir separation there will be
9. As stated by the court in Creasman, the presumption is that, "property acquired
by a man and a woman not married to each other, but living together as husband and
wife, is not community property, and, in the absence of some trust relation, belongs to
the one in whose name the legal title to the property stands." 31 Wn. 2d 345, 351, 196
P.2d 835, 841 (1948).
10. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text infra.
11. As enunciated in Creasman, the presumption appeared to be conclusive. See
Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951). However in Dahlgren v. Blo-
meen, 49 Wn. 2d 47, 53, 298 P.2d 479, 485 (1956), the court stated that the presumption
is rebuttable. Later in Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627, 630, 305 P.2d 805, 808 (1957),
the court stated that presentation of "evidence to the contrary" prevents the presumption
from arising. The Iredell view was followed in West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 313,
311 P.2d 689, 691 (1957).
12. West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957).
13. The parties to a meretricious relationship have the same right to contract with
each other as do other persons. Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 386, 407 P.2d
967, 976 (1965). However, in the absence of any proof of a conveyance or contractual
relationship (such as a deed of conveyance, partnership, joint venture or a resulting
trust), the court will not assume that the parties had any agreement that property ac-
quired by one of them was to be shared equally with the other. Therefore, the mere fact
of such cohabitation alone does not vest any rights on the part of one person in the accu-
mulations of the other during the period of cohabitation. Id.
14. Kenneth W. Weber, Summary of the Current Status of the Law of the State of
Washington Concerning the Rights of Partners to a Meretricious Relationship and the
Rights and Obligations Concerning Children Born Outside of Lawful Wedlock, pre-




the same deleterious result for the meretricious party who fails to
make a partial contribution of capital. 15
Thornton's holding and dicta offer two solutions to these inequities:
first, the court's implied partnership rationale created a fourth excep-
tion to the Creasman presumption; and second, the court in dicta
noted that Creasman arguably should be overruled and its archaic
presumption invalidated. 16
II. IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP
In Thornton appellant argued the existence of an implied partner-
ship based on the facts and circumstances surrounding her operation
with decedent of a business for a profit. Although the court discussed
two other legal theories upon which recovery could be granted,' 7 it
ultimately held that the appellant had made out a sufficient prima
facie case for the existence of an implied partnership to avoid a
motion for nonsuit. In so holding the court relied on Nicholson v.
Kilbury,'8 which has long provided the basis for the law of implied
partnership in Washington.' 9 However, this was the first time that
15. Like Washington, other community property jurisdictions hold that in the ab-
sence of an agreement to pool earnings, a partnership, a joint venture or circumstances
sufficient to establish a resulting or constructive trust, mere cohabitation by a man and a
woman with knowledge that a valid marriage is not in existence does not vest any rights
in one person in the accumulations of the other during the period of such relationship.
See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712(1953), Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal.
2d 657, 371 P.2d 329 (1962).
16. 81 Wn. 2d at 79, 499 P.2d at 870.
17. The additional theories were "(1) the existence of a contract or agreement to
make a will ... and (2) the existence of a relatively long-term, stable meretricious rela-
tionship during which the parties appeared to hold themselves out as husband and wife."
81 Wn. 2d at 75, 499 P.2d at 866. To establish the existence of a contract to make a will
in Washington it is necessary to demonstrate: (1) that the contract as alleged was entered
into between the deceased and the person asserting the contract; (2) that the services
contemplated as consideration for such agreement have actually been performed; and
(3) that the services were actually performed in reliance upon the agreement. Humphries
v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965). The trier of fact must be convinced of
the high probability that the required elements of a contract are present. Cook v. Cook,
80 Wn. 2d 642, 497 P.2d 584 (1972).
18. 83 Wash. 196, 145 P. 189 (1915).
19. The court in Nicholson stated:
The existence of a partnership depends upon the intention of the parties. That in-
tention must be ascertained from all of the facts and circumstances and the actions
and conduct of the parties. While a contract of partnership, either expressed or im-
plied, is essential to the creation of the partnership relation, it is not necessary that
the contract be established by direct evidence. The existence of the partnership may
be implied from circumstances, and this is especially true where, as here, the evid-
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Nicholson had been expressly applied to a case involving a meretri-
cious relationship to protect the nontitled party.20 Since, as the court
in Thornton noted, the Creasman presumption does not apply to im-
plied partnership cases, the result is a fourth instance in which the
Creasman presumption will not arise with respect to a meretricious
relationship.
Prior to Thornton the court applied what. amounted to a double
standard by frequently utilizing an implied partnership theory of re-
covery with respect to non-meretricious cases,2 1 yet denying it when
the parties cohabited in a meretricious relationship. The result was
that an equitable distribution of the property was often precluded by
application of the Creasman presumption, in spite of the fact that the
court disclaimed "any opinion or intended reflection on the moral
status of a couple living in a meretricious relationship.M2
The Thornton decision abandoned this double standard with regard
to the doctrine of implied partnership by finding a prima facie case
was made out, irrespective of whether or not decedent's and appel-
ence touching the inception of the business and the conduct of the parties
throughout its operation, not only tends to show a joint or common'venture but is
in the main inconsistent with any other theory. Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383,
98 Pac. 186. It is well settled that no one fact or circumstance wilPbe taken as the
conclusive test. Where, from all the competent evidence, it appears that the parties
have entered into a business relation combining their property, labor, skill and
experience, or some of these elements on the one side and some on the other, for
the purpose of joint profits, a partnership will be deemed established.
83 Wash. 196, 202, 145 P. 189, 195 (1915) (emphasis added).
20. In Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 263 P.2d 1044 (1951), a case in which the
Creasman presumption was rebutted by "evidence to the contrary," the court could have
applied implied partnership reasoning. In Poole the man contributed labor in running a
tavern while the woman supplied most of the cash from the profits of a beauty salon.
Nevertheless the court's only reference to a partnership theory is in passing when it
stated "the evidence establishes a joint venture if not a partnership between the parties
.. " In addition, Humphries v. Riveland, supra note 13, could have provided the basis
for a partnership theory of recovery if it is assumed that services performed by the party
staying at home were not a gratuity. Justice Finley urged just such a result in his dissent.
21. See, e.g., Eder v. Reddick, 46 Wn. 2d 41, 278 P.2d 361 (1955), Purdy & Whit-
field v. Dept. L. & I., 12 Wn. 2d 131, 120 P.2d 858 (1942), Barovic v. Constaniti, 183
Wash. 60, 48 P.2d 257 (1935).
22. Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 386, 407 P.2d 967, 977 (1965). The dis-
claimer was reiterated in Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d at 77, 489 P.2d at 867. In contrast to the
avowed approach of Washington, Louisiana has made a different determination with
regard to a couple that cohabits without the formality of marriage. There, persons who
live together in such relationships are placed "in the interest of good morals, public
order and the best interests of society" under certain disabilities as regards one another
in three general areas: contracts, partnerships and donations. See, e.g., Cole v. Lucas, 2
La. Ann. 946, 952 (1847). See generally Note, Community Property-Open
Concubinage-Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481, 44 TULANE L. Rav. 562, 564 (1970).
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lant's relationship was meretricious in nature. Unfortunately, the liber-
alization of the law of implied partnership may not benefit parties to a
meretricious relationship who lack a "partnership to operate a busi-
ness for profit." Hence, in a relationship in which one party works,
taking title in his or her name, and the other stays at home performing
household duties, the latter still might be denied a share of the prop-
erty accumulated during their relationship by the presumption enunci-
ated in Creasman.23
III. INVALIDATION OF THE CREASMAN PRESUMPTION
Although the Thornton court relied on the theory of implied part-
nership, it went on to state that it was "dubious about the continuing
validity of the legal presumption or fiction accepted and applied by
the court in Creasman.124 Indeed the presumption should be invali-
dated for several reasons: (1) the application of the presumption cou-
pled with the dead man's statute25 often results in an outcome that is
unfair and contrary to the probable intent of the parties; (2) the pre-
sumption makes an illogical distinction between labor and monetary
contributions; and (3) the presumption may be unconstitutional.
Any distribution ordered by a court should be designed to give effect
to the intention of the parties. Even the Creasman case alludes to that
goal.26 Thus, since parties who have lived harmoniously in a long and
stable meretricious relationship terminated only by death presumably
would desire that the survivor be adequately provided for, the court
should implement that intent. However, the Creasman presumption
often frustrates such a result. If title is in the deceased's name, the
Creasman presumption coupled with the dead man's statute27
probably will block the survivor from establishing an interest in their
joint accumulations. However if the couple separates while both par-
ties are living, the "dead man's" statute will not bar testimony by the
nontitled party, and the presumption will not preclude an equitable
23. See note 9 supra.
24. 81 Wn. 2d at 77, 499 P.2d at 867 (1972).
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.030 (1959). For a discussion of the Dead Man's Stat-
ute, see generally Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 Ouio L. J. 89 (1963).
26. 31 Wn. 2d 345, 351, 196 P.2d 835, 841 (1948).
27. See note 25 supra.
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share for the nontitled party.2 8 The effect of the former outcome is
emphasized when children are born of the relationship and the nonti-
tied survivor suddenly finds himself without property or an adequate
means of support. Hence the consequence of the Creasman presump-
tion is not to aid the court in deciding hard cases, but to deny justice
when the plaintiff's partner has died without a written agreement re-
garding disposition of their property.29
The Creasman presumption also makes an invalid distinction be-
tween labor and monetary contributions. If a party can trace a mone-
tary contribution or prove that he actually advanced funds to promote
the couple's joint well-being, the court will award that party a pro rata
share. On the other hand, the party bringing an action to establish a
part interest in property because of services rendered in the form of
household duties or the like, may find those services viewed as a gift.3 0
The contention that a party's services as cook, housekeeper and home-
maker are a gift seems illogical and invalid. A party contributing ser-
vices in the home should receive as much protection as one contrib-
uting money or property. Indeed, if household services are deemed to
be a gift, the logic underlying the concept of community property is
open to question.31
Finally, as Justice Finley noted in Thornton, the Creasman pre-
sumption may very well be unconstitutional. There exists a long line of
28. Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d at 78, 499 P.2d at 868.
29. See Note, Establishment of Interest in Intestate Decedents' Estate, 41 WASH. L.
REv. 578, 581 (1966).
30. The court in Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965),
found that services such as housework and yardwork rendered by a meretricious spouse
were a gratuity and in the absence ofproof of a contractual agreement did not afford a
legal basis for appellant's claim to one-half of decedents estate. The five to four decision
was accompanied by Justice Finley's vigorous dissent in which he urged that the case be
remanded for further proceedings with respect to the appellants right to share in the es-
tate commensurate with the intent of the parties and their contributions to the partner-
ship, inferred or implied, over the thirteen year period of the relationship. Id. at 400, 407
P.2d at 980. Note that had that person hired a housekeeper and worked, thereby contrib-
uting dollars to the relationship, the presumption probably would have been rebutted by
"evidence to the contrary."
31. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § I (2d
ed. 1971), stating:
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the founda-
tion of the concept is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the law being that, with
respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a community of which each
spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity,
and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after its dissolution.
641
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criminal cases in which statutory presumptions have been held uncon-
stitutional. In Tot v. United States,32 the Court held such a presump-
tion to be unconstitutional, adopting the test that there must be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed. More recently, in Leary v. United States,33 the Court modified
the test to require "substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact upon which it is
made to depend."34 Further, other cases indicate that presumptions
may be held unconstitutional in civil as well as criminal cases and that
the same test may be applied to both.35 If statutory and judicial pre-
sumptions may be equated, the fact that Washington courts have left
the parties "as they placed themselves" in meretricious cases despite
evidence of household services or a long term and stable relationship
suggests that the Creasman presumption lacks a basis in fact and
therefore may be unconstitutional. 36
Coupled with the suggestion that the Creasman presumption should
be invalidated was the court's hint of a new presumption that a party
to a long term and stable meretricious relationship may have a claim
to assets on that basis alone.37 Apparently under the "long term and
stable test" if a couple has lived together for an extended period of
32. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). This case involved a statute which made it a crime for a
person previously convicted of a crime of violence to receive any firearm in an inter-
state transaction. The statute, 15 U.S.C. § 902(0 (1942), specifically provided that "the
possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evid-
ence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped, transported or received, as the case
may be, by such person in violation of this act."
33. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Leary involved a presumption that a possessor of marijuana
is deemed to know of its unlawful importation.
34. Id. at 36.
35. In Mobil J.K.R.R. v. Turnipseed,219 U.S. 35 (1910), a civil case, the Supreme
Court stated that "if a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself in prescribing a
rule of evidence, in either civil or criminal cases, does not shut out from a party affected
a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all the facts bearing on the
issue, there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him."
Hence, while it appears the "rational connection" necessary to uphold the presumption
was found in Turnipseed, the Court by implication held that presumptions may be il-
legal in both civil and criminal cases and that the same test will be applied to both. Later
in Western & Atd. R.R. v. Henderson, 270 U.S. 639 (1929), another civil case, the Court
did invalidate such a presumption. The rationale behind that invalidation was that the
presumption therein, unlike that in Turnipseed, did not vanish upon the introduction of
opposing evidence but rather "created an inference that is given the effect of evidence to
be weighed against opposing testimony and is to prevail unless such testimony is found
by the jury to predominate." Id. at 644.
36. See, e.g., Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965);
Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
37. 81 Wn. 2d at 76, 499 P.2d'at 867.
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time, the relationship is "stable" by definition and the nontitled sur-
vivor will be granted a share of their joint accumulations. However, a
problem arises with regard to a stable meretricious relationship which
both parties intend to be long term but in which one of the parties dies
prematurely. Presumably in such an instance the court will deal with
each case on its facts, perhaps finding the requirement of "long term
and stable" to be met where such is consonant with the intent of the
parties.38 Thus, although the long term and *stable qualification is
ambiguous, it seemingly would give the court the flexibility to deal
with the parties in a just and equitable fashion.
IV. JUST AND EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The Thornton court's suggestion that the Creasman presumption
should be invalidated is meritorious. However, the court further inti-
mated that if it should again be presented with a case involving a mer-
etricious relationship, it would view the joint accumulations of the
couple as "community property."3 9 If the court actually meant that it
would treat such property as community property in the statutory
sense, then it must face several related problems. Such an approach
would be in direct conflict with long standing case law40 based upon a
number of current statutes. For example, the Washington community
property statute specifically states, "Property... acquired after mar-
38. In the many meretricious relationships which are comparatively temporary, it is
logical to assume that the parties had no intention to share the accumulations made
during the course of their cohabitation. On the other hand, where a meretricious relation-
ship has existed for a relatively short period of time, during which the couple has made
several significant purchases (such as a house and furniture), one might find an intent on
the part of the parties to share in such accumulations.
39. 81 Wn. 2d at 77, 499 P.2d at 868. So viewing the joint accumulations of a
couple living in a meretricious relationship represents a definite change for Justice Fin-
ley, author of the majority opinion in Thornton. In his dissents in both West v. Knowles,
supra note 12, and Humphries v. Riveland, supra note 13, the Justice had urged the
court to divide the property in a "just and equitable fashion." For further elaboration,
see text accompanying note 44 infra.
40. The proposition that only property acquired during marriage can give rise to
community property appears to have its roots in Spanish law. Thus for "community of
property between husband and wife there must be a marriage which could only result
from the parties undergoing the ceremony of marriage and the wife going to live with
the husband." W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 55
(2d ed. 1971). In Washington this thesis was enunciated in In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash.
86, 96 P. 684 (1908). Further, the subsequent marriage of the parties does not alter the




riage by either husband or wife or both, is community property." 41
Furthermore, the necessity of marriage as a prerequisite of finding a
"community interest" is an inherent part of numerous other statutes.42
Moreover, the court's suggestion that invalidation of the Creasman
presumption would give rise to "community property" is inconsistent
with its treatment of property accumulated by a couple that holds an
erroneous but "good faith belief' that they are married. In such a case
the property is not treated as community in character, but is subject to
division on the basis of what, under all the circumstances, would be
"just and equitable" to the innocent party.43 Arguably, if property
held by a couple living in a meretricious relationship is to be treated
as community property, then property held by a couple with an erro-
neous "good faith belief' in the validity of their marriage should be
treated in the same manner. However, this would be a needless modi-
fication of Washington law with regard to the latter class of individ-
uals.
A desirable alternative to the approach suggested by the court in
Thornton would be to treat the parties to a meretricious relationship
in a just and equitable fashion 44 as if they had a "good faith belief" in
the "validity" of their relationship. This approach not only would
41. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
42. If the court does extend the community property concept to include parties to a
meretricious relationship, then by parallel reasoning each party should also have other
miscellaneous rights such as the right to maintain a wrongful death action [WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 4.20 (1959)] and the right to receive workmen's compensation [WASH. REV.
CODE tit. 51 (Supp. 1972)]. However, beneficiaries of both of these rights are limited to
the wife or husband and immediate family [Wrongful Death, WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.020 (1959); Workmen's Compensation, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.020 (Supp.
1972)], thus excluding parties to a meretricious relationship. Similarly, Social Security
benefits require the claimant to have gone through a marriage ceremony, 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(1)(A) (1970). Parties to a meretricious relationship also would be denied re-
covery in cases where other federal compensatory statutes lack language specifically in-
cluding them. See, e.g., Lawson v. United States, 192 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952) (Death on the High Seas Act); Beebe v. Moormack Gulf
Lines, Inc., 59 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1932) (Federal Employer's Liability Act); United
States v. Robinson, 40 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1930) (War Risk Insurance Act); Keyway Stev-
edoring Co. v. Clark, 43 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1930) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act).
43. See note 5 supra. The success of the "just and equitable" approach has been
demonstrated through its application to property dispositions in cases in which a valid
marriage was contracted and divorce ensued. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1959).
44. In determining that a party is entitled to "just and equitable" treatment the
court should consider such things as the respective merits of the parties, through whom
the property was acquired, monetary and labor contributions, whether or not children
were born of the relationship and who is to care for them, and the general condition in
which the termination of the relationship will leave each of the parties.
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avoid the case and statutory conflicts associated with treating the
property as community property, but also would remove the artificial
distinction that has long been in existence in Washington between "in-
nocent" and "meretricious" relationships. Further, this is consistent
with the view that all parties should be treated fairly, without regard
to the moral character of their relationship. Thus, in both "innocent"
and "meretricious" cases the parties would be treated in conformity
with their probable intent and in congruity with current mores.
CONCLUSION
Although it is salutary that the supreme court utilized implied part-
nership reasoning in a meretricious relationship setting, it is unfortu-
nate that its application may be limited to those instances in which the
parties engaged in a partnership to operate a business for profit. As a
result certain classes of people remain unprotected, primarily due to
the archaic Creasman presumption that property accumulated by a
meretricious couple belongs to the one in whose name legal title rests.
As it intimates it will, the court should invalidate the presumption. It
should be noted, however, that invalidation does not necessarily mean
equating the joint accumulations of a meretricious couple with com-
munity property. Indeed, not only would that approach have pro-
found effects on the law in Washington, but it is an unnecessary ad-
junct to the invalidation of the Creasman presumption. Rather, the
assets of the couple should be divided in a just and equitable fashion,
an approach which would give the court sufficient flexibility to handle
individual cases in the manner it deems fair. In this way the distinction
between meretricious and "good faith" relationships would be elimin-
ated, allowing all parties to be treated fairly without regard to the
moral character of their relationship.
W.P.F.
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